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Abstract
Based on the Constructivist theoretical approach for analyzing international 
relations by identifying the forces which influence states behavior, this article com-
pares major junctions in Spain’s international status and the way systemic changes 
influenced the course of Spanish-Israeli relations. The article looks at Madrid’s entry 
into the international trade regime represented by the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) in 1963, Spain’s joining the Council of Europe in 1977, Madrid’s 
inclusion in NATO in 1982, and its entry into the European Economic Community 
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(EEC) in 1986. We argue that this last milestone left Madrid with little option but 
to establish relations with Israel. This proved that systemic pressure, derived from 
Spain’s new status in the EEC, was crucial for the establishment of bilateral diplo-
matic ties.
Keywords
GATT; NATO; EEC; Spanish-israeli relations; diplomacy; international 
relations.
Resumen
Basado en la teoría constructivista de análisis de relaciones internacionales e 
identificando los factores que operan sobre el comportamiento de los Estados, este 
artículo compara los momentos cruciales en la evolución del estatus internacional de 
España en el período de la posguerra. Nos referimos a la entrada española en el régi-
men internacional de intercambio comercial representado por el Acuerdo General de 
Tarifas y Comercio (GATT) en 1963, la inclusión de España en el Consejo de 
Europa en 1977, la participación del país en la OTAN desde 1982 y, por último, la 
entrada de España en la Comunidad Económica Europea (CEE) en 1986. Argu-
mentamos que este último hito en la trayectoria internacional española dejó poco 
margen a Madrid, no quedándole más remedio que establecer relaciones diplomáti-
cas con el Estado de Israel. Esto demuestra que la presión del sistema internacional, 
derivada del nuevo status de España en la CEE, fue crucial para la formalización de 
relaciones bilaterales entre ambos países.
Palabras clave
GATT; OTAN; CEE; relaciones hispano-israelíes; diplomacia; relaciones 
internacionales.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In spite of a shared heritage dating back centuries and common national 
interests, such as a mutual fear of Soviet influence across the Mediterranean 
during the Cold War, it took 38 years after the establishment of the State of 
Israel (1948) and a decade after Francisco Franco’s death (1975) for diplo-
matic relations to be formalized between Jerusalem and Madrid (1986). It 
was first and foremost Spain s´ entry into the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC) in 1986 that left Madrid with little option but to establish rela-
tions with Israel. The trigger for this diplomatic milestone proved that 
systemic pressure, derived from Spain’s new status in the EEC, was crucial for 
the establishment of diplomatic ties1. Earlier cases in which Spain underwent 
or was exposed to systemic change, however, did not lead to formal ties with 
Israel: Madrid’s entry into the international trade regime represented by the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1963, Spain’s joining 
the Council of Europe in 1977, the Camp David Accords between Israel and 
Egypt in 1978 and Madrid’s inclusion in NATO in 1982. Based on the Con-
structivist theoretical approach for analyzing international relations by iden-
tifying the forces which influence state behavior, combined with turning 
point decision-making analysis (TPD), this article compares the above men-
tioned systemic changes in the context of Spanish-Israeli relations. It does not 
attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the evolution of bilateral rela-
tions in between the cases identified as opportunities for change. The article 
highlights the unique factors which were in play with Spain’s entry into the 
EEC and thus made the difference in 1986.
1 For a detailed account of Spain-Israel relations during the years 1948-1956 see Rein 
(1997) and for the period from 1956-1992 see Setton (2016). 
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Constructivism became a leading force in International Relations (IR) 
theory in the early 1990s, following the end of the Cold War2. The two other 
major IR paradigms, Realism and Liberalism, failed to predict the collapse of 
the Eastern Bloc and the fall of the Soviet Union. Constructivism provided a 
rational explanation based on its social interpretation of global affairs3. For its 
proponents, states are the primary actors in international politics. All research 
into important events must therefore begin and end with states4. Further-
more, there is a “real” world out there, a myriad of forces, that are indepen-
dent of the spectator and which are observable5. The international system is 
recognized as the cause while state actions are the effect. A change in the sys-
tem may lead to an alteration in state behavior. The main variable is the rela-
tive power of the state within the system. Constructivism allows for state 
interests and perceptions to change over time. It seeks to identify and under-
stand the sources of change, which are usually driven by institutionally medi-
ated interactions at the systemic level6. These institutions are actual 
organizations, such as governmental and non-governmental groups, as well as 
various sets of identities and interests that do not exist apart from the partic-
ipants’ ideas about how the system works7.
Relations between nations result from the decisions made by individu-
als. By definition, a turning-point decision (TPD) deviates significantly from 
previous policy on a specific issue. For states it can result in a dramatic shift 
in the relationship. A TPD is generated by stimuli which influence the deci-
sion-making process. The motivation comes from a situational change in 
either the internal or external environment of the decision-makers. The stim-
ulus for change passes through the decision-maker’s cognitive system. Two 
conditions are then required to bring about a TPD. The decision-makers need 
to feel discomfort with the present situation they face and to believe that their 
new contemplated policy is the only viable option under the circumstances; 
the present strategy no longer provides an appropriate response8.
In the context of Spanish-Israeli relations there were always internal and 
external forces which influenced the development of bilateral ties. The more 
obvious or visible forces included, for example: the continuous Arab challenge 
2 Weber (2010): 62.
3 Walt (1998): 41.
4 Weber (2010): 66.
5 Marsh and Furlong (2002): 18.
6 Walt (1998): 40.
7 Griffiths et al.(2008): 53.
8 Auerbach (1986): 537. 
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to Spain’s relations with Israel especially when there was any hint of bilateral 
progress; the Europeanization of Madrid’s foreign policy particularly during 
the transition from dictatorship to democracy following the death of Franco in 
late 1975 and until Spain’s ascension to the EEC in early 1986; Spain’s limited 
efforts to involve itself in the Middle East peace process; Madrid’s long stand-
ing support for the Palestinian cause; and also the gradual evolution of com-
mercial and cultural ties between Israelis and Spaniards. There were less 
noticeable influential forces such as the Catholic Church and the shadow of 
anti-Semitism. Traditional anti-Semitic thinking was well-entrenched in 
Spanish society despite the absence of a sizeable Jewish community9.
Throughout the 20th century Spain fulfilled a marginal role in global 
politics as “at very best, a second rank European state”10. The historiography 
fittingly treats Spain as “a small power” with limited resources and capabili-
ties yielding restricted international influence, definitely in the Middle East 
where the major powers were at play11. Spain’s international position was 
boosted in the 1980s by its inclusion in NATO and the EEC. However, it 
remained all throughout at best a second tier power. Israel operated in a hos-
tile environment, frequently involved in armed conflict with neighboring 
states, while facing varying levels of international isolation. Even though Jeru-
salem was often able to project strength in its own region, the same cannot be 
concluded for its position beyond the Middle East, particularly in interna-
tional fora. Due to Spain’s position of weakness and Israel’s strategic focus, 
which was primarily military orientated and predominantly centered on its 
nearby geographic sphere of interaction, both countries had limited resources 
and capabilities available to pursue the development of their ties on a truly 
independent and bilateral basis. Unsurprisingly, the cultivation of their bilat-
eral relationship was not perceived by either government as a primary national 
interest. Therefore, only under two scenarios could bilateral relations progress 
toward formalization. Either the establishment of diplomatic ties would not 
threaten other vital national interests or an external force would be powerful 
enough to push both sides forward toward each other, overcoming the fears, 
challenges and obstacles along the way. In the case of Spanish-Israeli relations 
it was the latter which proved true.
Actually, during the first years of Israeli statehood, Spain sought unsuc-
cessfully to establish official ties with Israel as another means to overcome 
9 For more on contemporary anti-Semitism in Spain see Álvarez Chillida (2002); 
Rodríguez Jiménez (2007); Rein and Weisz (2011).
10 Rees (2003): 637 and Gillespie and Youngs (2000): 1-13. 
11 Balfour and Preston (1999); Rein (1999). 
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international isolation. By adhering to a moral foreign policy standard, anew 
out of the ruins of the Holocaust, Israel refused formal ties with the former Axis 
supporter. By 1953 Israel began adopting a more pragmatic view toward a rela-
tionship with Franco’s Spain12. In a breakaway from its ethical approach to for-
eign policymaking, the Israeli government signed a Reparations Agreement 
with West Germany (1952). Officials in Jerusalem understood that there were 
benefits to formal ties with Madrid, particularly in the face of growing interna-
tional isolation. This change of policy came too late. By 1953 the Franco regime 
had reached strategic understandings with the United States and the Vatican, 
while it had committed itself to a “special relationship” with the Arab world13. 
Two years later, Spain finally became a full member of the United Nations. The 
Spanish were legitimate players in the post-war international community. 
Madrid no longer deemed relations with Israel of strategic value14.
Thereafter until 1986, Spanish officials avoided calls to upgrade ties 
with Jerusalem. Israeli diplomats heard over and over again that Madrid did 
not consider that the present time “sea el momento oportuno para el establec-
imiento de las relaciones requeridas”15. There was no genuine desire to over-
come the obstacles to formalizing relations with the Jewish state. The 
opportune moment (“momento oportuno”) was illusive. Occasionally, there 
were pressures which challenged Spain’s indifference toward Israel. Rarely 
was there a force capable of upgrading the bilateral relationship. The first such 
occurrence took place when Spain joined GATT in 1963. It became then 
apparent that only a powerful force, an external one at the system level, was 
capable of bringing about change in the relationship.
II. GATT MEMBERSHIP AND THE END OF A TRADE BOYCOTT ON ISRAEL
The Spanish leadership realized half way through the 1950s that the 
autarky economic system had failed. Spain had bounded itself by tariff walls, 
12 For a detailed account of Spain-Israel relations during the years 1948-1956 see Rein 
(1997). 
13 For a general overview of Spain’s foreign policy toward the Middle East see Delgado 
(2002): 299-330.
14 For an in-depth analysis of the origins of Spain’s close association with the Arab 
world see Algora Weber (1995). 
15 Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación (hereafter: AMAEC), R. 5522.2, 
1 February 1956 from MAE to Spain’s Embassy in Paris. See also Lisbona (2002); 
González García (2001).
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the national economy was handicapped by its restricted buying power, without 
means to import raw materials or capital goods necessary to modernize and 
supply its industry. The Spanish economy reached a dead-end. A turn-around 
required that tariffs be lowered to boost trade, that economic controls be 
dropped and, above all, that Spain be integrated into the world market16. 
Franco needed modern capitalism to survive and the Economic Stabilization 
Plan of 1959, drafted by the Opus Dei led technocrat economic team, was 
pushed forward specifically to dismantle autarky by opening up Spain’s econ-
omy while limiting liberalisation on other fronts: political, cultural and social17.
In the lead-up to 1963 the Franco government faced a classic turning 
point decision situation. Madrid understood that it was in Spain’s best inter-
est to join the GATT international trade in order to secure economic growth18. 
Consequently, as Spain’s prepared for GATT membership it upgraded its 
commercial dialogue with other GATT signatories, including Israel which 
had already become a member during the summer of 1962. This included 
contacts with Israeli commercial attaches in a number of capitals, including 
for example, in Athens and London19. The Spanish representatives were asked 
to collect information on the status of commercial ties with various coun-
tries20. They suggested that Spain’s commercial policy toward Israel would 
change in compliance with GATT. There were also higher profile activities 
taking place, such as the invitation to visit Spain handed over by Spain’s Dep-
uty Minister for Tourism to Meir De-Shalit, the Head of the Israel’s state 
tourism company21. This was the first time an Israeli official received a formal 
16 Carr (1980): 156.
17 Balfour (2000): 268.
18 As a result of joining GATT, Spain’s international trade was boosted as it agreed to tariff 
reductions introduced between 1968 and 1972 during the Kennedy Round of GATT 
negotiations (1964-1967); see Prados de la Escosura and Sanz-Villaroya (2011): 9.
19 ISA [Israel State Archives, Jerusalem] /RG 130/MFA/3142/7, 9 May 1963 from Bar-
tur (Geneva) to the MFA on a noticeable increase in contacts between Spain and 
Israel regarding trade relations, particularly by Spanish initiative. 
20 ISA/RG 130/MFA/3142/7, series of telegrams between the Commercial Attaches in 
Athens (5 April 1963, 18 April 1963) and London (3 April 1963, 11 April 63, 17 
April 1963) and the MFA on the contacts between Israel and Spain towards an 
expected upgrade in commercial ties between both countries after Spain’s expected 
admission to GATT in the summer of 1963. 
21 ISA/RG 130/MFA/3142/7, 7 May 1963, by Moshe Alon, Head of the MFA’s Eco-
nomic Department, to Meir De-Shalit at the Prime Minister’s Office, asking him to 
accept the invitation handed over to him by Spain’s Deputy Minister for Tourism to 
visit Spain. 
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invitation from the Spanish government. De-Shalit reported afterward on the 
warm reception he received from his counterpart in Madrid22.
In the lead up to Spanish GATT membership, the most important 
sequence of communication and reciprocal visits took place from 1962 to 
1963 between José Solís Ruiz (Minister and Secretary General of the Move-
ment, 1957-1969) and his team with Israeli representatives from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Israel’s national shipping company Zim23. The 
Israeli diplomats involved included M. Alon, D. Golan, A. Reisner and R. 
Molcho and Y. Behar, while ZIM was represented by its General Manager, 
Zvi Yechieli. ZIM fulfilled a pivotal role in triggering these talks. The Israeli 
shipping company was a strong supporter of the liberalisation of trade with 
Israel. Its managers hoped their fleet could benefit from transporting goods 
between both countries as bilateral trade increased24. Solís wished to secure 
contracts to build new merchant ships for ZIM25. A mutually beneficial rela-
tionship was envisaged. During these talks, the Israelis also met with Manuel 
Fraga Iribarne (Minister of Information and Tourism, 1962-1969), Alberto 
Ullastres Calvo (Minister of Trade, 1957-1965), as well as senior representa-
tives of the Ministries of Finance and Trade but noticeably not with any offi-
cials from the Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores at the Palace of Santa Cruz. 
Yet, Franco did not object to advancing commercial ties within limitations, 
despite the opposition to such progress at the Foreign Ministry in Madrid26. 
22 Maariv, 14 February 1964.
23 José Solís Ruiz, responsible for the Syndicates, wished to demonstrate that Spain 
could benefit from the ties with Israel, which in turn would be leveraged to gain sup-
port from Jews presumed to be in leadership positions at important financial institu-
tions. The same applied to the General Federation of Labor in Israel, the Histadrut, 
viewed by the Spanish as an influential player in international fora; see Setton 
(2016): 34-35. 
24 ISA/RG 130/MFA/3142/7, undated report by Moshe Alon on his trade meetings in 
Spain, along with Zvi Yechieli of ZIM from 4-8 June 1962. It should be pointed out 
that from 1957 to 1962, Yair Behar had served in Spain as an official representative 
of the World Sephardi Federation.
25 Ibid.; ISA/RG 130/MFA/3142/7, 17 February 1963 by Yair Behar to Moshe Alon at 
the MFA. Solís also included his son-in-law, Fernando González Manresa, in the 
commercial talks with Israel preceding Spain’s entry into GATT, possibly in the 
hope of personally benefiting from the expected trade between both countries; see 
Setton (2016): 35.
26 ISA/RG 130/MFA/6528/7, 24 July 1963 by Moshe Alon and David Golan at the 
MFA to the Foreign Minister and Minister of Finance, Trade and Industry summa-
rizing the talks with Solís and his team since 1962.
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The delegations managed to formulate an understanding for promoting bilat-
eral trade.
Solís and his Israeli counterparts agreed to four limited objectives which 
needed to be fulfilled for trade relations between both countries to grow: (1) 
termination of Spain’s de facto trade embargo on Israel; (2) establishment of 
a bilateral trade framework between both states based on mutual most-favored 
nation (MFN) status; (3) formation of a private company dedicated to bilateral 
trade; and (4) a trade representative (unofficial and at Israel’s expense) had to 
be appointed to manage the private company27. One can assume that these 
four objectives were reviewed by Franco. The embargo was lifted in May 
1963. Franco ordered this ahead of Spain’s entry into GATT. Israeli officials 
presumed that Solís was influential in delivering this positive result28.
The first two objectives were the minimum required by Spain to comply 
with its commitment to the GATT treaty. The next two goals were limited in 
order to keep official Spain at a safe arm’s length. Trade between both coun-
tries would be promoted by a private enterprise. There would be no official 
Israeli representative on Spanish soil to support this initiative. Furthermore, 
the Spanish government would not assume any of the costs involved in set-
ting up this private operation and managing it thereafter. They did not have 
a genuine desire to significantly boost trade with Israel. If Franco would have 
ever had such a serious intention, as the Israeli Consul General in Lisbon 
noted in April 1962, then he would have asked his foreign minister at the 
time, Fernando María de Castiella, to take the lead in the bilateral talks29. 
Perhaps only a Foreign Ministry led initiative could have resulted in commer-
cial ties between both countries really taking-off. Such a move would have 
signaled an official endorsement for direct bilateral trade, which could not 
have been denied when confronted by the Arab states.
27 ISA/RG 130/MFA/3142/7, 17 February 1963 by Yair Behar of the Economic 
Department at the MFA which confirmed to the head of the department, Moshe 
Alon, that during a meeting with Solís in Madrid in June 1962, the steps which 
would be required to normalize commercial ties between Israel and Spain were for-
mulated and agreed upon. A report also present in this file summarizes in detail the 
trip which took place on 4-8 June 1962. 
28 ISA/RG 130/MFA/981/5, 24 July 1963 to the Foreign Minister and Finance Minis-
ter on the developing commercial dialog between Solís and Israeli representatives to 
promote trade between both countries; 
29 ISA/RG 130/MFA/3142/7, 24 April 1962 from Amir (Lisbon) to the MFA ques-
tioning the motivation behind the move by Solís to promote a commercial dialog 
with Israeli representatives. 
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Still, the trade talks were most likely coordinated behind the scenes by 
the Palace of Santa Cruz and the Palace of El Pardo to minimize the potential 
fallout with the Arab bloc as a result of any progress in commercial ties with 
Israel expected after joining GATT. In order to guarantee that any advance-
ment would be limited in scope and restricted to unofficial channels, Franco 
and Castiella likely managed the relationship with Israel through their trusted 
emissaries; Solís, Ullastres, and Fraga Iribarne.
At the end of the day, Spain needed to play by the rules of the interna-
tional trading community if it wished to benefit as a member. Sufficient sys-
temic pressure was created to push for change. The two conditions to generate 
a TPD were present once GATT membership was on the cards: (a) it was in 
the best interest of Franco’s government, in pursuit of economic growth, to 
join GATT; and (b) liberalizing trade with Israel was the only viable option 
under the circumstances in order to comply with GATT membership rules. 
As a result, Spanish officials understood, albeit reluctantly, that commercial 
ties with Israel would need to be liberalized. In this spirit, the Spanish Ambas-
sador to Geneva, Marquez de Minerva, was instructed as follows in June 
1963: “Puede comunicar al Embajador de Israel que España, al adquirir su 
condición de parte contratante del GATT se consideraría obligado a la apli-
cación frente a este país del apartado I del Art. XIII del Acuerdo General sin 
discriminación”30.
But this instruction came with much reluctance. The Ministerio de 
Asuntos Exteriores (MAE) instructed its embassies abroad on Spain’s obliga-
tions to GATT with respect to commercial ties with Israel: “Es muy impor-
tante impedir cualquier acto de formalización oficial de relaciones comerciales 
entre España e Israel, que podría tener repercusiones muy graves en la posición 
de los países árabes con respecto a España…dada la delicada situación en la 
Asamblea General…”31.
Castiella and the MAE were more concerned with securing Arab votes in 
Spain’s favor at the UN General Assembly on debates concerning decoloniza-
tion which could threaten Spain’s hold of its territorial possessions in North 
Africa, specifically Ceuta, Melilla, Western Sahara and Equatorial Guinea. 
Madrid also did not want to let any advance in relations with Israel derail the 
grand objective of one-day restoring Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar.
GATT membership obligated Spain to treat Israel on the basis of MFN 
status. The four objectives agreed by Solís and his Israeli counterparts back in 
1962 and implemented by 1964 created a “win-win” solution. Bilateral 
30 AMAEC, R. 8702.4, 8 June 1963 from the MAE to Spain’s Ambassador in Geneva. 
31 AMAEC, R. 8702.4, 11 July 1963 from the MAE to Spain’s embassies abroad.
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commercial ties were upgraded. In this context, before Spain signed up to 
GATT official records in Madrid referred to any trade with Israel as goods 
destined to the “Middle East”, whereas after 1963: “Only recently do they 
specifically mention Israel in official export publications”32.
The company EDEFI (Española de Desarrollo Financiero), owned by 
Israeli and Spanish shareholders, was established in 1964 to promote bilateral 
trade33. The Israeli shareholders were ZIM Israel Navigation Company and 
its subsidiary M. Dizengoff & Co. Ltd., while the Spanish shares were held 
by individuals associated with the Syndicates, including possibly a son-in-law 
of José Solís Ruiz. The shares were distributed equally between Israelis (50 %) 
and Spanish (50 %). It was launched with the approval of Franco and full 
knowledge of his cabinet34. Chaim Asher, Israel s´ Commercial Attaché in 
Istanbul, was transferred to Madrid and appointed by Israel’s Ministry of 
Trade and Industry to be the company s´ General Manager in January 1964. 
He was an unofficial Israeli trade representative in Spain under the cover of 
General Manager of EDEFI35.
Beyond the realm of trade and associated formalities, GATT did not 
require Spain to have full diplomatic relations with the other treaty members. 
Therefore, Spain complied with the treaty by paying a minimal diplomatic 
price in terms of its relationship with Israel and so avoided a potential fall-out 
with the Arabs. After all, Madrid could convincingly argue that GATT mem-
bership left it with no option but to liberalize its trade with all other member 
states, including Israel, and most important it did not take any additional dip-
lomatic steps beyond the minimum required by the treaty. Meanwhile, no 
formal diplomatic upgrade in Spanish-Israeli relations would take place for 
the next two decades.
32 Maariv, 14 February 1964.
33 The shares of EDEFI were split in two, whereby 50 % were held by an Israeli part-
nership between ZIM Israel Navigation Company, Ltd. and its subsidiary Dizengoff 
& Co. Ltd., while the other 50 % were held by Syndicate members in Spain, includ-
ing Dionisio Martín Sanz (member of the Cortes and agricultural engineer); ISA/
RG 130/MFA/3152/5, undated memo on Israel — Spain relations. 
34 ISA/RG 130/MFA/3142/7, 16 March 1963 by Stevenson Miller, Representative for 
ZIM in Spain, to Zvi Yechieli at ZIM headquarters in Haifa reporting on the Span-
ish trade mission which travelled to Israel 24 February until 1 March 1963.
35 ISA/RG 130/MFA/3152/5, late 1963 from the Ministry of Trade and Industry to 
Chaim Asher announcing his appointment as General Manager of EDEFI and that 
in parallel he would also fulfil the role of an unofficial Israeli government represen-
tative in Madrid. See also Setton and Rein (2015): 678-695. 
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III. SPAIN’S JOINING THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE CAMP DAVID 
ACCORDS
Only after the death of Franco in late 1975 and following Madrid’s 
embarkation on a peaceful transition process to democracy did Spain’s inter-
national position begin to shift for the better. In reality, however, Spain’s road 
to democracy was long and progress was slow. The Spanish people wanted 
change but they did not want to achieve it through disorder, conflict and vio-
lence. Spain in transition was burdened by economic recession, with high 
social frustrations and tensions, which could have easily exploded into chaos. 
Spanish policymakers advanced cautiously fearing that if at any point the 
national consensus were lost, the whole project would be in jeopardy. An 
upgrade in Spanish ties with Jerusalem could have been part of the transition 
process. It made sense to include Israel in the diplomatic push for the univer-
salisation of foreign relations called for by King Juan Carlos I during his cor-
onation speech at the Cortes in Madrid on 22 November 197536. Yet, Spanish 
governments also did not want to entertain foreign policy adventures. Their 
diplomacy for much of the transition period was a continuation of the coun-
try’s foreign policy during the Franco years. Spain was still dependent on 
Arab oil. For the Palaces of Zarzuela, Moncloa and Santa Cruz, relations with 
the Arab countries, specifically Saudi Arabia, were a top priority. They needed 
to limit the economic damage to Spain’s fragile economy caused by record 
breaking energy prices. At the time Arab diplomats in Madrid threatened 
that there would be repercussions against Spanish business interests across the 
Arab world should there be a rapprochement between Madrid and Jerusalem. 
The Arabs threatened to limit oil supplies and to cancel a loan of US $450 
million committed to the Spanish government37. Potential threats to Western 
Sahara, Ceuta and Melilla, the Canary Islands and to the freedom of naviga-
tion of Spain’s fishing fleet off the coasts of North Africa remained real38. 
36 “Mensaje del Rey”, ABC, 22 November 1975.
37 Setton (2016): 96. See also ISA/RG 130/MFA/8946/1, 16 October 1983, from 
Madrid to the Europe 2 Dept. at the MFA in Jerusalem on the cancellation of an 
order for Spanish armaments by Saudi Arabia following publication of a meeting 
between Spain’s Foreign Minister, Fernando Morán (1982-1985), and the President 
of the World Jewish Congress, Edgar Bronfman Sr. 
38 Spain is one of the world’s largest consumers of fish and seafood and the Canary 
Current Large Marine Ecosystem, extending from the coast of Morocco to Guinea 
Bissau, is the world’s third largest fishery and the most important one in Africa, pro-
ducing about two to three million tons of biomass each year; see ISA/RG 130/
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Spain needed to orchestrate its foreign policy so as to not find itself in a poten-
tial major diplomatic showdown with the Arab countries, or even worse in a 
military confrontation, with one or more of its North African neighbors, 
specifically Morocco and Algeria. Meanwhile, the Spanish also faced the 
challenge presented by Libya’s arming of the Basque separatist group ETA39. 
In an interview with Informaciones in early 1983 José María de Areilza con-
cluded: “el ´lobby´ de los intereses petrolíferos en Oriente Medio, amparado 
por el mítico pro-arabismo, inercia, el miedo y los prejuicios frustraron aquel 
intento, que era consecuencia de la declaración que España hizo en el sentido 
de establecer relaciones diplomáticas con todos los países del mundo”40.
A policy of non-recognition of the Jewish state was still used by Madrid 
to secure Arab support for its prime national interests, including its territorial 
possessions in North Africa.
Meanwhile, European policy toward Spain improved after Spain’s first 
democratically elected government under Adolfo Suárez came to power in 
June 1977. As a result, Spain was admitted to the Council of Europe in Novem-
ber 1977. This move recognized the democratic ambitions of post-Franco Spain. 
It was an endorsement of Madrid’s domestic transition policy but not a driver 
for foreign policy change. Council of Europe membership did not come along 
with a requirement for Spain to upgrade its relationship with Israel and so no 
change took place in the bilateral relationship between Madrid and Jerusalem.
In theory, the signing of the Camp David Accords on 17 September 
1978 between Israel and Egypt supposedly created a new opportunity for 
Madrid to advance ties. The year before Spain’s foreign minister Marcelino 
Oreja y Aguirre declared: “Existe un claro propósito del Gobierno de man-
tener relaciones con todos los países del mundo. Pero el Gobierno entiende 
también que, en el caso de Israel, debe producirse una circunstancia nueva 
que permita la negociación ajustada a las decisiones de la ONU…”41.
MFA/8946/1, 27 April 1983, Israel Embassy in Paris reports back to the Europe 2 
Dept. at the MFA in Jerusalem that Madrid was concerned of possible Moroccan 
reprisals against Spanish fishing interests off the coast of Morocco in the event of a 
rapprochement with Israel
39 ISA/RG 130/MFA/8946/12, 18 September 1983, summary of bilateral relations 
with Spain in 1983 from the Europe 2 Dept. to the Deputy Dir. Gen. of the MFA in 
Jerusalem.
40 Informaciones, 21 February 1983.
41 Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Dirección General de la Oficina de Información 
Diplomática, (1986), quoting statement made by Marcelino Oreja on 14 July 1977 
at the Palace of Santa Cruz.
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Arguably, Madrid could have claimed that the new state of affairs in the 
Middle East justified a realignment of Spain’s policy toward Israel. But this 
landmark peace agreement was limited to Egypt and Israel. Madrid still had 
to take into consideration its relationship with the rest of the Arab world, 
from its important oil suppliers in the Persian Gulf and all the way to its 
neighbors closer to home in North Africa. Meanwhile, Adolfo Suárez wished 
to promote a “third way” foreign policy initiative, whereby advancing the Pal-
estinian cause, and leveraging Spain’s relations with the Arab world, Madrid 
could assist the West in countering Soviet influence spreading across the Arab 
and Islamic countries42. The Spanish government was also afraid that Cairo’s 
realignment with the Western bloc following the Camp David Accords would 
lead to a rise in Soviet activities elsewhere across North Africa to compensate 
for the loss of Egypt. Moscow needed to ensure that its reach into the West-
ern Mediterranean, particularly as a means to counter movements by the U.S. 
Navy’s Sixth Fleet in the region during times of crisis or war, was not adversely 
impacted by the pro-West political shifts in the Middle East. The Americans 
had a substantial advantage over the Soviets in the Mediterranean. First, 
NATO controlled the two major straits leading into the sea; Gibraltar and the 
Turkish Straits. The largest air forces and naval fleets in the region were 
aligned with NATO. The Americans also had access to support facilities 
across the region. The U.S. Navy had a supportive theatre in which to oper-
ate43. The Soviets feared that Western influence could spread to other North 
African states at their expense. Therefore, the Kremlin decided to bolster its 
position in the region. Through a series of arrangements and less formal 
agreements with Libya, Tunisia and Morocco, Moscow established its first 
shore-based access to the western Mediterranean44. This advance by the Sovi-
ets threatened Spain’s territorial possessions in North Africa. Madrid could 
not afford to jeopardize its ties with the Arab world as a result of a peace 
42 Setton (2016): 106-107. Spain set a European precedent in September 1979 when 
Suárez became the first European head of state to formally welcome Yasser Arafat in 
Madrid as Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). This was a 
move by Madrid to boost Spain’s standing across the Arab world, reminding all that 
the Spanish did not maintain relations with the Jewish state and instead supported 
the Palestinian struggle for statehood. See also ISA/RG 130/MFA/8914/14, 4 April 
1980, by Head of Propaganda Dept. to M. Sasson on the latter s´ visit to Madrid (20-
23/05/1980) stating that Suárez pursued the “third way” foreign policy as a means 
to divert attention in Spain from his government’s domestic policy failures. 
43 Roberts (1982): 1-2. 
44 McCormick (1987): 13-16.
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agreement limited to Israel and Egypt. Ultimately, any thoughts by Oreja to 
seize the opportunity after the signing of the Camp David Accords to advance 
ties with Israel were dampened by their fears closer to home.
IV. THE 1982 ENTRY TO NATO: NO PRE-CONDITION TO FORM TIES 
WITH ISRAEL
Spain’s Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez resigned in January 1981. He was 
replaced by Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo who thereafter served in the Palace of 
Moncloa between 1981 and 1982. Even though the Sotelo government was 
short-lived, it did give thoughtful consideration to formalizing ties with Israel. 
Calvo Sotelo’s nomination by the Cortes impacted Spain’s foreign policy 
direction in two major ways. After the failed military coup on 23 February 
1981, commonly known as “23-F”, the international community, particularly 
the EEC members, realized the need to complete Spain’s transition into a full 
a member of the Western camp or risk losing their Iberian partner alto-
gether45. Calvo Sotelo announced to the Cortes during his swearing-in speech 
that his foreign policy goals would be to: “conseguir para nuestro país una 
definición de política europea, democrática y occidental, clara e irreversible, 
lejos de sueños que puedan delatar una tentación aislacionista respecto del 
marco occidental”46.
After the failed coup, Spain’s government aspired to become a full mem-
ber of the Western camp; in terms of security through NATO and politically 
and economically via the EEC. It therefore pursued membership negotiations 
with both organizations47. In March 1981 Spain’s Foreign Minister, José 
Pedro Pérez Llorca, declared that Spain’s transition to democracy would only 
be complete once Spain became a full member of the EEC48. Talks with the 
EEC, however, stalled primarily due to French resistance. The Socialist gov-
ernment in Paris, led by Francois Mitterrand, preferred to delay progress until 
after the next general elections in Spain, scheduled for the end of 1982. 
45 Crespo MacLennan (2004): 227. For more on the coup of “23-F” see Reinlein 
(2002).
46 Ibid.: 228. See also Jorge Lafuente del Cano (2012). 
47 Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo has written about his experiences during the transition period 
(1990) and more can be learned from his speech “Sobre la Transición Exterior” given 
at the Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas in Madrid on 16 November 
2005 (http://www.racmyp.es/docs/discursos/D7.pdf).
48 El País, 17 March 1981
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Mitterrand anticipated that the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) 
would win the national election and he preferred to wait until then in order 
to negotiate an agreement with his ideological allies49.
Progress was only achieved on the NATO track. After brief negotiations, 
Spain joined the North Atlantic alliance on 30 May 1982. Spain’s accession 
to NATO, however, was not conditioned on Madrid carrying out any foreign 
policy adjustment. NATO had greater concerns well into a second Cold War 
with the Soviet Union (1979-1985). The détente achieved between the two 
blocs earlier during the same decade collapsed. By the late 1970s the East-
West rivalry in global politics heated up again and the blocs reverted back to 
competing against each other over their spheres of influence. The renewed 
tensions between the blocs was triggered by a series of events, such as the 
ongoing decolonization in Africa (independence of Angola and other Portu-
guese colonies), the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan50. Spain’s direct access to the Mediterranean Sea and North 
Africa, as well as its ability to provide a logistical base for U.S. activities in the 
Middle East, were important for NATO. The North Atlantic alliance was 
also weakened from inside. The tensions between Greece and Turkey over 
Cyprus meant that the U.S. was limited in its use of military bases in either 
country. There were strong Communist and Socialist political elements with 
anti-NATO tendencies among the organization’s Mediterranean members: 
France, Italy and Greece. Spain’s accession to NATO not only strengthened 
the organization from a military perspective but it also gave it a political 
boost51. Altogether, NATO was eager for Spanish involvement. There was no 
call on Madrid to establish diplomatic ties with Israel, especially since the 
Jewish state was not a formal member of the North Atlantic alliance. Conse-
quently, NATO could not be the mechanism at the international system level 
to apply pressure on Spain to advance its ties with Israel52. Beyond the context 
of NATO, the issue of Spanish-Israeli relations did come up here and there in 
meetings with foreign heads of state and politicians with their Spanish 
49 Crespo MacLennan (2004): 231.
50 For more on the second Cold War and a comprehensive analysis of increased ten-
sions between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and early 
1980s see Halliday (1987); Westad (2007) and Gaddis (2005). 
51 Wojna (2008): 540. 
52 ISA/RG 130/MFA/8946/12, 18 September 1983, from Brussels to the MFA in Jeru-
salem on a meeting with NATO’s General Secretary, Joseph Luns, during which he 
admitted that as the head of NATO he had no real leverage over Spain in the context 
of Israeli-Spanish relations. 
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counterparts. However, there was no systemic pressure on Madrid to upgrade 
ties53. Unsurprisingly, the veteran senior Israeli diplomat, Gideon Rafael, 
wrote in his memoirs from 1981 that: “The efforts with Spain, before and 
after Franco’s demise, were fruitless”54.
V. ENTRY TO THE EEC AND THE NORMALIZATION OF TIES WITH ISRAEL
Even though there were no major diplomatic breakthroughs in the bilat-
eral relationship during the years 1976-1982, there was an understanding on 
both sides that the status quo would not last much longer. As the transition 
progressed and Spanish EEC membership approached there was little doubt 
in Madrid that relations with Israel would be upgraded. In December 1984, 
the Spanish daily Cambio 16 reported that Spain’s Prime Minister, Felipe 
González, repeatedly told his European colleagues that Spain would establish 
53 The government of Calvo Sotelo was ready to formalize ties by early summer of 
1982. However, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 derailed this plan. The 
government in Madrid could not justify the initiative, especially as the Spanish 
media was united in condemnation of the Israeli aggression. The opportunity resur-
faced again in September that year as the Calvo Sotelo government thought that 
despite the Middle East crisis, the establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel could 
generate favourable sentiment amongst the Spanish electorate in their favour, with 
the PSOE already ahead in the public opinion polls just one month before the sched-
uled general election. Pérez-Llorca was scheduled to meet with Israeli Foreign Min-
ister, Yitzhak Shamir in New York in 16 September 1982 at the UN General 
Assembly and to announce the exchange of ambassadors. Just before the meeting 
was to take place, reports spread worldwide of the Sabra and Shatila massacre of Pal-
estinian and Shiite Muslim civilians in Beirut (16-18 September 1982) carried out by 
Christian Phalangist militia allied with Israel. Again, this was deemed not to be the 
“opportune moment” the Spanish sought for establishing ties with Israel. Conse-
quently, the initiative never materialized. In essence, nothing happened in June and 
September 1982 since there was no international systematic pressure at the time to 
force Spain into normalizing ties with Israel or to neutralize any Arab threat of retal-
iation should a rapprochement take place; see Setton (2016): 113-114; see ISA/RG 
130/MFA/8945/3, 10 October 1983, report by the Head of Europe 2 Dept. at the 
MFA in Jerusalem on Calvo Sotelo’s decision to formalize ties with Israel which were 
derailed by the June 1982 invasion of Lebanon followed by the Sabra and Shatila 
massacre; see also ISA/RG 130/MFA/8946/2, 11 February 1982, on the same topic 
by the Europe 2 Dept. to the Israel Embassy in Washington. 
54 Rafael (1981): 358.
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diplomatic relations with Israel after its accession to the EEC: “En cuanto al 
establecimiento de relaciones, Felipe González dice a sus interlocutores 
europeos que lo hará ´después´  del ingreso español en la CEE”55.
Indeed, nothing would happen before 1 January 1986. On 24 December 
1984, Ya reported that at the PSOE 30th Conference, Felipe González told the 
Labor Party Member of Knesset, Michael Harish, that Spain: “establecerá rel-
aciones con Israel en próximos meses, a más tardar en enero de 1986 (fecha en 
que está previsto el ingreso de España en la Comunidad Económica Europe-
a)”56. In comparison to earlier times, the mid-1980s were undoubtedly the 
most comfortable time for Madrid to establish ties with Israel. Spanish mili-
tary concerns related to its territorial possessions in North Africa were 
reduced. Madrid was aware of the diminished military capabilities of the 
North African states. The political divisions amongst these countries did not 
go unnoticed. These reduced the chance that a strong and united front would 
materialize into a credible threat against Spanish interests. Furthermore, 
Spain’s membership in NATO added to the sense of security amongst the 
decision makers in Madrid. Spain wisely increased its interdependence with 
North Africa through a series of defense and collaboration treaties57. Mean-
while, there was a growing recognition amongst the Arab countries that the 
formalization of Israeli-Spanish relations was for all practical purposes a done 
deal. Furthermore, Arab opposition to such a move was seriously weakened 
once Egypt, a major Arab power, had recognized the Jewish state with the 
Camp David Accords in 197858.
55 Cambio 16, 10 December 1984. See also ISA/RG 130/MFA/8946/12, 24 October 
1983, from Paris to Europe 2 Dept. at the MFA in Jerusalem reporting on a meeting 
between Prof. Henrí Meshulam and Spain’s Deputy Foreign Minister Gonzalo Puente 
Ojea during which the latter stated that the normalization of relations was conditioned 
on Spain’s entry into the EEC and obtaining the “approval” of Saudi Arabia. 
56 Ya, 24 December 1984.
57 Setton (2016): 142; Spain signed defence agreements with Morocco, as well as with 
Mauritania and Tunisia between 1987 and 1989. Madrid increased its economic 
involvement in the Maghreb, specifically Morocco. Spanish development aid funds 
to Morocco totalled over US $500 million between 1977-1994, representing 58 % of 
Spain’s aid to North Africa and 7 % of its total global aid budget during those years. 
58 ISA/RG 130/MFA/8946/12, 13 October 1983 from Madrid to the Europe 2 Dept. 
at the MFA in Jerusalem on statements made by Iraq’s ambassador to Spain on Bagh-
dad’s understanding that the formalization of relations between Madrid and Jerusa-
lem was inevitable; see also ISA/RG 130/8946/12, 20 September 1983, from Madrid 
to the Head of the Europe Division at the MFA in Jerusalem on a meeting between 
Felipe González and Fernando Mujica. 
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The Spanish Prime Minister wished to regain Spain’s position from cen-
turies earlier as a European power. He needed a tabula rasa to do so which 
also meant resolving the anomaly of Spanish-Israeli relations. His foreign 
minister, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, also admitted in an interview with 
Diario 16 in March 1986 that: “Una vez dentro de la CEE era insostenible no 
mantener relaciones diplomáticas con Israel”59.
To avoid this unwanted situation, the state of affairs with Israel needed 
to be normalized sooner rather than later. In parallel, Israel launched an 
aggressive and effective diplomatic campaign linking Spain’s EEC member-
ship and the normalization of relations with Jerusalem. Israeli diplomats 
made every effort to ensure that the issue remained on the diplomatic agenda 
so that Spanish officials could not avoid the issue60. In May 1985, the Israel 
Embassy in Paris reported: “With respect to the diplomatic relations with 
Spain which was raised by the Ambassador, (Roland) Dumas ordered to 
include the subject on the agenda of the Franco-Spanish summit which will 
take place in France this month”61.
This campaign peaked when each of the EEC member states needed to 
ratify the agreement for Spanish membership62. The Spanish wanted to ensure 
that the ratification process advanced smoothly. They already understood that 
59 Diario 16, 5 March 1986.
60 ISA/RG 130/MFA/8914/15, 13 February 1981, from the Head of Europe 2 Dept. to 
the Deputy Dir. General of the MFA in Jerusalem on the need to leverage relations 
with Denmark, West Germany and The Netherlands to pressure Madrid on advanc-
ing bilateral ties with Israel; see also on the same topic ISA/RG 130/MFA/8946/11, 
19 March 1982, by MFA in Jerusalem to S. Hadas in Madrid on intentions of the 
Italian government to raise the issue of Israeli-Spanish relations during an upcoming 
meeting between Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini and Felipe González; 
and ISA/RG 130/MFA/8946/2, 11 February 1983, by Europe 2 Dept. to the Israel 
Embassy in Washington; and ISA/RG 130/MFA/8946/12, 12 September 1983, 
from Brussels to the MFA in Jerusalem.
61 ISA/RG 130/MFA/8874/6, 7 May 1985 from Israel Embassy in Paris to the Head of 
Europe 1 Department at the MFA in Jerusalem following a meeting between the 
Israeli Ambassador and the French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas. A similar telex 
dated 5 June 1985 was sent from the Israel Embassy in Tokyo to the Director Gen-
eral of the MFA in Jerusalem indicating that the embassy had received information 
that Giulio Andreotti, Italy’s Foreign Minister (1983-1989), discussed with his 
Spanish counterpart the need to normalize ties with Israel.
62 Haaretz, 20 November 1985, a petition was signed by 72 members of the French Par-
liament on the eve of the debate in the French legislature to ratify Spain’s ascension 
to the EC. 
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an inevitable result of the process would be the normalization of ties with Israel: 
“González appears to be someone committed to normalization and talks about 
it as something which will happen in the future… there is a connection between 
normalization and Spain’s entry into the Community, that is understood, 
maybe unpleasant but accepted — it is not talked about”63.
Despite Israeli efforts, the member states fell short of declaring the nor-
malization of relations with Israel a formal precondition. In this spirit, follow-
ing an interview in May 1985 by Maariv’s reporter, Esther Edelstein, with the 
Danish Foreign Minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, the Israel Embassy in 
Copenhagen reported: “Denmark communicates to Spain its expectation for 
the establishment of full relations with Israel, but it will not put pressure in 
the context of her ascension to the Community”64.
The same embassy reported in November 1985 that the Danish govern-
ment: “Does not miss an opportunity to signal to the Spanish the importance 
in establishing relations, but does not link it as a condition for ratification”65.
Consequently, the Felipe González government made numerous com-
mitments, public and private, to its peers in Europe, and the United States as 
well, that Spain would establish relations with Israel. The Danish Member of 
the Folketinget, Flemming Kofod-Svendsen, received in late August a letter 
from Spain’s Ambassador in Copenhagen, Joaquín Ortega Salinas, which 
stated outright: “The Minister Fernández Ordóñez has just confirmed the 
will of the Spanish government to establish diplomatic relations with Israel 
before next elections as a consequence of our entry in the Common Market”66.
The Spanish government simply could no longer justify the absence of 
relations with Israel. As a member of the EEC, Madrid had to comply with 
the Acquis Communautaire. This also meant normalizing ties with the Jewish 
63 ISA/RG 130/MFA/8874/6, 18 June 1985 by Y. Anug, Head of the Europe Division, 
to Shmuel Hadas (Madrid). 
64 ISA/RG 130/MFA/8874/6, 10 May 1985 from the Israeli Embassy in Copenhagen 
to the Europe 1 and 2 Departments at the MFA in Jerusalem on the update provided 
by Maariv’s reporter Esther Edelstein following her interview with Denmark’s For-
eign Minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen.
65 ISA/RG 130/MFA/8874/3, 21 November 1985 by Ilan Baruch (Copenhagen) to the 
Europe 2 Department at the MFA in Jerusalem following an update by the Danish 
Foreign Minister at a Foreign Affairs Committee meeting at the Danish Folketniget 
on Denmark’s efforts to convince Spain to normalise ties with Israel. 
66 ISA/RG 130/MFA/8874/4, 22 August 1985 by Spain’s Ambassador stationed in 
Copenhagen, Joaquín Ortega Salinas, and addressed to the Danish Member of the 
Folketinget, Flemming Kofod-Svendsen.
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state since it would have been diplomatically challenging for Spain to be part 
of the Community, as well as to participate in the EPC (European Political 
Cooperation) and later the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy)67. 
The Spanish daily ABC admitted that the Spanish government understood 
that their “…integración en la CEE era incompatible con la subsistencia de tal 
anomalía”68.
Nevertheless, Felipe González could not afford to be seen as having been 
pressured into upgrading relations with Israel69. Therefore, normalization 
only came after 1 January 1986 once Spain was a full member of the EEC. 
The transition to democracy was a success and Madrid was inside the EEC. 
Ties with Jerusalem were upgraded when it finally made sense for Spain do 
so. Felipe González realized that Madrid was on the verge of becoming a mid-
level power in the arena of European and international politics. This was his 
opportunity to make his mark on history. Israel’s successful multi-front cam-
paign pressuring Spain to establish ties with the Jewish state disturbed 
González. Had there not been any such Israeli campaign, then Spain may 
have even delayed the establishment of ties even until January 1989. Only 
then was Spain scheduled to assume the Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union. At that point it would have been completely untenable for 
Madrid not to have diplomatic relations with Jerusalem. The MFA dreaded 
another delay and this was possibly an additional driver for the aggressive 
campaign undertaken in 1985 to pressure Spain to make a move by no later 
than early 198670.
67 A legal opinion formulated by the EEC at the request of the Spanish government 
confirmed that Madrid did not have to establish diplomatic relations with Jerusalem 
as a condition for ascension. However, Spain would have to honor the treaties 
between the EEC and Israel once it became a member; see ISA/RG 130/
MFA/8914/15, 1 December 1980, a copy of the legal opinion formulated by the EEC 
and delivered to the Spanish is forwarded to the MFA in Jerusalem by the Israel 
Embassy in Brussels; see also Núñez Peñas (2013).
68 ABC, 17 January 1986. See also Rein (2007); Hadas (2009): 75-87; Abadi (2004): 
177-202.
69 ISA/RG 130/MFA/8946/12, 12 July 1983, meeting between representatives of the 
Anti-Defamation League of Bnai Brith and Spain’s Ambassador to the United States, 
Gabriel Mañueco.
70 ISA/RG 130/MFA/8874/6, 20 June 1985 from Yaakov Peridan (Brussels) to the 
Heads of the Europe 1 and 2 Departments at the MFA in Jerusalem on the possibil-
ity that Spain will delay the establishment of ties with Israel until it assumes the Pres-
idency of the Council of the European Union, as per the rotation schedule, in 
January 1989. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
It is important to point out that by the mid-1980s Spanish confidence 
was at an all-time high due to the combined military, political and economic 
protection which NATO and EEC membership provided. This enabled 
Madrid for the first time to overcome its fears of possible Arab reprisals to a 
rapprochement with Israel. The Spanish were aware of the diminished mili-
tary capabilities of the North African states, the unlikelihood that they would 
unite into one front against Spain, all while relations improved markedly with 
the key potential aggressors; Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania. In addition, 
by the mid-1980s, Spain’s dependence on Arab oil diminished. For their part, 
the Arab countries understood that their leverage on Spain decreased sub-
stantially into the 1980s. They probably never imagined that a Spanish rap-
prochement with Israel would take so long. In fact, only Iran and Kuwait 
recalled their Ambassadors from the Spanish capital after the relations were 
established. Both heads of mission returned a bit later to their posts as if noth-
ing happened71. Years later, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, Spain’s Foreign Minis-
ter from 2004-2010 and Bernardino León, a leading Spanish career diplomat 
and politician, admitted that the normalization of ties with Israel did not 
have any adverse effect on Spain’s relations with the Arab world72.
It is evident from the above analysis that the only force which was capa-
ble of changing the state of affairs between Spain and Israel was strong and 
concentrated pressure coming from the international system. Systemic pres-
sures were bearing down on decision makers in Madrid to change their policy 
toward Israel, convincing them that the benefits from a policy change out-
weighed the rewards resulting from the status quo overshadowed by its fears 
of falling out with the Arab world. Leading up to the summer of 1963, Spain’s 
leadership faced a classic turning point decision situation. They understood 
that it was in Spain’s best interest to join the international trade regime under 
GATT. They desperately sought to pursue economic growth and overcome 
the failures of its autarky economic system. Spain needed to play by the rules 
of the international trading community if it wished for its economy to grow. 
Israel was also a signatory to GATT and for Madrid to benefit from the inter-
national trade regime it had to comply with the basic requirement to liberalize 
trade affairs with all the other signatories to the agreement. Consequently, 
sufficient systemic pressure was created to push for change in the bilateral 
relationship, even though it was only limited to trade affairs. Since GATT did 
71 Ya, 22 January 1986 and El País, 23 January 1986.
72 Moratinos and León (2002): 112.
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not require full normalization of ties between its participants, Spain did not 
advance its relationship with Israel any further than the absolute minimum 
required by the rules of the international trade regime. Just like with GATT 
membership, no preconditions were placed on Madrid with regards to its rela-
tionship with Jerusalem when it came to Spain’s membership in the Council 
of Europe in 1977 or in NATO in 1982. Nor did the Spanish face any serious 
direct or indirect diplomatic pressure orchestrated by Jerusalem to upgrade 
ties with Israel in 1963, 1977 and 1982.
This, however, was different in 1985-1986. The coordinated Israeli dip-
lomatic effort across European capitals and beyond, to link Spain’s admittance 
to the EEC with the formalization of ties with the Jewish state, was the main 
driving force for Spain’s informal commitment made to the other Community 
members that it would do so shortly after January 1986. The Israeli Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs should get the credit for having pushed Felipe González into 
promising his EEC counterparts that relations with Israel would be formalized 
once Spain’s ascension was accomplished. Anyhow, Spain would have had to 
normalize ties with Israel at the very latest by January 1989, since it could not 
effectively assume the role of President of the Council of the EEC, without 
having ties with a country which had full diplomatic relations with all the 
other Community members. Spain could not represent the Community, espe-
cially as President of the Council, in its pursuit to contribute to peace efforts 
in the Middle East without having ties with both sides of the conflict. Felipe 
González understood that waiting until 1989 was not a viable foreign policy. 
His government had to establish formal ties with Israel as soon as possible in 
1986 in order to complete the Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy as a 
member of the EEC. In doing so he achieved for Spain what Franco could only 
dream of attaining; Middle Power status. This was the highest international 
position for Spain since the Disaster of 1898 when it was defeated by the U.S. 
and lost the remnants of its colonial empire (Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Phil-
ippines). Unsurprisingly, when all was said and done, Felipe González asked 
during a televised interview following the establishment of diplomatic ties: “In 
any case, what did we achieve by not having relations with Israel?”73.
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